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DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND FINANCIAL
INTERESTS
In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 6th Cir. R.
26.1, Appellants hereby state the following:
Appellant U.S. Citizens Association is not a publicly owned corporation.
No publicly owned corporations, not parties to this appeal, have a financial interest
in the outcome of this appeal.
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RULE 34(a) REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to FRAP Rule 34(a) and 6th Cir. R. 34(a), Appellants respectfully
request oral argument. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act presents
for the first time a Congressional mandate compelling American citizens to
purchase a specific service from private entities. That mandate creates legal issues
of national concern and of first impression. Accordingly, oral argument may prove
especially helpful in evaluating the issues presented.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction Is Proper under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
On May 12, 2010, the Appellants (Plaintiffs below) filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (the “District Court”) against the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Heath and Human Services, the Secretary of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Attorney General of the United States,
and the United States of America, challenging the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act” (Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)), as amended by
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010)) (collectively, the “PPACA” or the “Act”). By their Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that PPACA’s requirement
that all uninsured individuals purchase health insurance in a government qualified
plan on or before January 1, 2014 (PPACA §§ 1500, 5000A (hereinafter
1
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“Individual Mandate”)) violated the Commerce Clause and Plaintiffs’ rights to
liberty, freedom of association, and privacy. They also sought an injunction
against enforcement of the unconstitutional Individual Mandate. The Plaintiffs
presented four counts for relief. In Count 1, they alleged that Congress lacked
constitutional authority to enact the Individual Mandate, particularly under the
Commerce Clause. In Count 2, Plaintiffs alleged that the compulsory association
with private insurance companies required by the Individual Mandate violates their
freedom of expressive and intimate association as guaranteed by the First and Fifth
Amendments. In Count 3, Plaintiffs claimed that the Individual Mandate violates
their due process liberty rights under the Fifth Amendment. In Count 4, Plaintiffs
claimed that the Individual Mandate violated their right to privacy emanating from
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
On October 8, 2010, the Appellees (Defendants below) moved to dismiss for
lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 12(b)(1)
and for failure to state a claim under FRCP Rule 12(b)(6). See R.E. 47,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 1 On November 22, 2010, the District Court
denied Defendants’ challenge on standing but nonetheless dismissed under FRCP
1

Records and documents necessary on appeal are included in the district court’s
electronic record and, so, under 6 Cir. R. 30 an appendix is filed in this matter that
includes only those documents not included in the electronic record. Under 6 Cir.
R. 28(a), references to the district court’s electronic record are designated “R.E.”
2
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12(b)(6) Plaintiffs’ Counts 2, 3, and 4 without reasoned opinion. See R.E. 58.
Plaintiffs’ Count 1 remained and the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on whether the Individual Mandate in the PPACA exceeded the outer
limits of the Commerce Clause. See R.E. 69, 70, 78, 79. On February 28, 2011,
the district court entered final judgment on Plaintiffs’ Counts 2, 3, and 4 pursuant
to FRCP Rule 54(b) without an opinion on the merits of those counts and further
ruled that it would not decide Count 1, the commerce clause challenge. See R.E.
82. District Court Judge David D. Dowd, Jr. “question[ed] the relevance of any
ruling [he] may make regarding the Commerce Clause issue given the more
advanced state of challenges to the Act in other jurisdictions and the ultimate
impact of the appellate rulings in those cases on the instant case.” Id. at 3
(refraining from issuing a decision because he said it “would fall into the realm of
conjecture”). The Court determined that Plaintiffs’ Counts 2, 3, and 4 were
“entirely separate from” Count 1, and, so, “the litigants are best served by allowing
an immediate appeal of . . . Counts 2, 3, and 4 given the uncertainty of the time
period in which the constitutionality of the Act relative to the Commerce Clause
will be determined in the federal courts.” Id. at 2, 3.
Under Rule 54(b), the Court concluded that “its prior dismissal of Counts 2,
3, and 4 is final, and that balancing all the factors . . . and the larger context of
litigation surrounding the Act, there is no just reason for delaying the entry of final

3
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judgment with respect to counts 2, 3, and 4 of plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint, and that final judgment should be so entered.” Id. at 2-3 (citing
Corrosioneering v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys., 807 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (6th Cir. 1986);
Pittman v. Franklin, 282 Fed. Apps. 418, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Pinney
Dock & Transport Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp. 816 F.2d 681, at *1 (Table) (6th Cir.
1987) (“[t]he appellate court gives substantial discretion to the district court’s
certification and reviews the district court’s findings under an ‘abuse of discretion’
standard”).
Jurisdiction over the district court’s final order dismissing plaintiffs’ Counts
2, 3, and 4 is therefore proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On March 31, 2011,
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal seeking review of the district court’s
decision to dismiss as a matter of law counts 2, 3, and 4.
Appellants Have Standing and the Case Is Ripe for Review.
As the District Court concluded, PPACA compels Appellants presently to:
(1) set aside funds to pay for health insurance they do not want and (2) identify and
associates with private insurers against their will. See Grapek Affidavit at ¶ 5;
Thompson Affidavit at ¶ 6. The individually named Appellants qualify for none of
PPACA’s exemptions. See Grapek Affidavit ¶ 5; Thompson Affidavit ¶ 9.
Although the Individual Mandate becomes effective in 2014, the Appellants
demonstrated a very high likelihood that it would apply to them unless their

4

Case: 11-3327

Document: 006110949623

Filed: 05/06/2011

Page: 15

circumstances were to substantially and unexpectedly change. Appellant Grapek
demonstrated that to afford health insurance required by PPACA in 2014, he must
presently begin saving money. See Grapek Affidavit ¶¶ 6-16; Shepherd-Bailey,
Current Burdens, at 5-14. The District Court thus properly found that Appellants
have standing to pursue their challenge. See Order, R.E. 58, at 5.
Three other federal district courts each concluded likewise in suits involving
comparably situated individual plaintiffs. See Thomas More Law Center, et al., v.
Obama, et al., 720 F.Supp. 2d 882, 889 (E.D.Mich., Oct. 07, 2010) (“the
economic burden due to the individual mandate is felt by plaintiffs regardless of
their specific financial behavior”); State of Florida, et al., v. U.S. Dept. HHS, 716
F.Supp. 2d 1120, 1145 (N.D.Fla Oct. 14, 2010); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, et al., 702 F.Supp.2d 598 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Individual Mandate is the first time in American history the United
States has compelled its citizens to transact business with private companies as a
condition of citizenship. Substantive issues germane to Count 1 of Appellants’
challenge below are pending before this Court in Thomas More Law Center, et al.,
v. Barack Obama, et al., No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. 2010). 2 Several courts have
acknowledged that the Individual Mandate is novel. See Florida, 2011 WL

2

Oral argument is scheduled in this Court for June 1, 2011.
5
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285683, at *20; Thomas More, 720 F.Supp. 2d at 893; Virginia, 702 F.Supp. 2d
598, 612 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010).
In the absence of an enumerated power express or implied in Article I of the
Constitution, Congress has no constitutional authority to impose the Individual
Mandate on the Appellants. Even if the commerce clause issues are decided
favorably to the government by this Court in Thomas More, the Individual
Mandate is still a forbidden exercise of power because it violates Appellants’
liberty, freedoms of intimate and expressive association, and privacy.
The right to liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment denies the federal
government power to deprive a competent adult of the liberty to refuse receipt of
unwanted medical treatment, even if the treatment is life-saving. Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1952); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
726 (1997). Encompassed within that liberty right, the federal government may
not compel a person to pay for the unwanted care or penalize a person who refuses
to pay for receipt of the unwanted care, either by requiring direct payment for it or
by requiring indirect payment for it through private health insurers. The freedom
of intimate and private association protected by the First Amendment denies the
federal government power to force private parties to associate against their will and
to compel private parties to support a promotional platform for a cause against

6
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their will. The Individual Mandate forces Appellants to associate with, and
divulge, medical confidences to a private health insurer against their will. It also
forces them to purchase health insurance for covered medical services that they do
not wish to purchase or receive and to promote a private insurance platform that
advocates acquisition of insurance in federally “qualified” plans. By compelling
Appellants to divulge highly personal and confidential medical information to
private health insurers, PPACA’s individual mandate violates Appellants’ right to
privacy.
Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the District Court’s
order and declare the Individual Mandate unconstitutional. There is no enumerated
power, express or implied, that permits the federal government to compel citizens
of this country to make a private purchase against their will, particularly one that
requires those citizens to pay for undesired medical care, associate against their
will, and divulge medical confidences to a private party (health insurers) against
their will. The Fifth Amendment liberty right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment; the freedom from unwanted intimate and expressive private
associations; and the right to privacy establish a bulwark against depriving
competent adults of those freedoms. That bulwark of liberty is rendered a mere
parchment barrier rent by the Individual Mandate. We ask this Court to restore the
primacy of the Constitution by invalidating the Individual Mandate.

7
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
I.

Does PPACA’s Individual Mandate violate the Appellants’ right to

liberty under the Fifth Amendment, including the right to refuse unwanted medical
service, the right “to be let alone,” and the corollary right to refuse payment for
unwanted medical service?
II. Does PPACA’s Individual Mandate, which requires Appellants to
purchase government-approved health care coverage from private companies
against their will, violate the Appellants’ rights to freedom of expressive and
intimate association under the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution?
III. Does PPACA’s Individual Mandate violate the Appellants’
constitutionally protected right of privacy by compelling a relationship with private
insurance companies against Appellants’ will which necessitates disclosure of
intimate medical information?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants filed suit on May 12, 2010. See R.E. 1. By their Second
Amended Complaint, on September 16, 2010, Appellants U.S. Citizens
Association, James Grapek, and Maurice A. Thompson alleged four legal claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief. See R.E. 45. At a September 7, 2010 case

8

Case: 11-3327

Document: 006110949623

Filed: 05/06/2011

Page: 19

management conference in chambers, the District Court requested that the parties
address standing and ripeness. See R.E. 22.
On October 8, 2010, the Appellees moved to dismiss Appellants’ second
amended complaint under FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See R.E. 47.
On November 22, 2010, District Court Judge Dowd ruled in principal
reliance on the opinion of Judge Roger Vinson in Florida ex rel. McCollum, 716
F.Supp. 2d 1120, that Appellants’ challenge was a case or controversy ripe for
review. R.E. 58, at 5. The Court then dismissed Plaintiffs’ Counts 2, 3, and 4,
stating only:
After considering plaintiffs’ second amended complaint in the context
of Twombly and Iqbal’s heightened “plausibility” pleading standard,
the Court concludes that Count 2 of plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint fails to satisfy that standard, and therefore cannot survive
defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Count 2. The Court’s review
of Counts 3 and 4 under the Twombly and Iqbal analysis results in the
same conclusion.
Id. at 10-11.
On December 3, 2010, the Appellees’ moved the District Court to stay
proceedings on Count 1, arguing that this Court would determine the issue in
Thomas More, et al. v. Obama, et al., No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. 2010). See R.E. 60,
Defs’ Motion to Stay Proceedings. Appellants opposed that motion, arguing, inter
alia, that a stay would substantially delay Appellants’ ability to pursue Counts 2, 3,
and 4 on appeal. See R.E. 61, Pls’ Opp. to Motion to Stay. The District Court
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denied Appellees’ motion to stay on December 20, 2010. The parties then briefed
cross-motions for summary judgment on Count 1. See R.E. 69, 70, 78, 79.
On February 28, 2011, the Court entered final judgment pursuant to Rule
54(b) on Appellants’ Counts 2, 3, and 4. See R.E. 82, Judgment Entry Pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the FRCP. Appellants moved the Court to clarify its February 28,
2011 Order or, in the alternative, issue a prompt decision on Count 1 so Plaintiffs
could appeal the entire case presented. See R.E. 83, Pls’ Mot. to Clarify Order Or,
In the Alternative, for Reconsideration (March 7, 2011). On March 17, 2011, the
District Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion, citing the Thomas More decision and
stating that “[i]t is within the [Court’s discretion] to defer a ruling in anticipation of
binding precedent and/or guidance from the Sixth Circuit on an issue presently
before the Court.” R.E. 86, Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Ruling (March
17, 2011), at 2.
Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 18, 2011. See R.E. 87,
Notice of Appeal to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 21, 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives approved H.R. 3590
(the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), and President Obama signed the
bill into law on March 23, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Healthcare Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11110

Case: 11-3327

Document: 006110949623

Filed: 05/06/2011

Page: 21

152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (collectively “PPACA”). PPACA includes Section
1501: “Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage.” Sections 1501
and 5000A require all U.S. citizens to purchase private health insurance plans that
are certified or “qualified” by the federal government. See PPACA §§ 1501(b),
5000A(a), (f). Failure to do so results in a financial penalty. See PPACA §
5000A(b). The act of purchasing health insurance does not alone satisfy the
PPACA. See PPACA § 1302(b)(1). Plans that qualify under the PPACA must at
minimum provide coverage for: ambulatory patient services; emergency services;
hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance use
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; prescription drugs;
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory services; prevention
and wellness services and chronic disease management; and pediatric services,
including oral and vision care. See PPACA § 1302(b)(1)(A)-(J).
Congress was warned that the Individual Mandate was unconstitutional. See
The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance, CBO
Memorandum, at 1-2 (August 1994). 3 According to the CBO,
A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance
would be an unprecedented form of federal action. The government
has never required people to buy a good or service as a condition of
lawful residence in the United States. An individual mandate would
have two features that, in combination, would make it unique. First, it
would impose a duty on individuals as members of society. Second, it
3

R.E. 69-5; see also R.E. 69-6.
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would require people to purchase a specific service that would be
heavily regulated by the federal government.
Id. In July 2009, the Congressional Research Service also alerted Congress,
warning:
Despite the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the
Commerce Clause, it is unclear whether the clause would provide a
solid constitutional foundation for legislation containing a
requirement to have health insurance. Whether such a requirement
would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the
most challenging question posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel
issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to
purchase a good or a service.
See Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health
Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., at 3 (July 24, 2009). 4
Appellant U.S. Citizens Association (“USCA”) is a national civic league
with its principal place of business in Akron, Ohio. See R.E. 45, Second Amended
Complaint, at 4 ¶ 12. USCA has approximately 27,000 members, including the
individually named plaintiffs, Jim Grapek and Maurice A. Thompson. Id. The
USCA seeks to “promote the virtues of conservatism” through advertising,
community action, and legal process. Id. Appellant Maurice A. Thompson is an
Ohio citizen and member of the USCA subject to the PPACA Individual Mandate.
Id. at 5-6, ¶ 13. Mr. Thompson can claim no exemption from the PPACA
Individual Mandate and, based on Mr. Thompson’s income and financial

4

R.E. 69-6.
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resources, he falls within the PPACA’s Individual Mandate in 2014. Id. Appellant
James Grapek is a citizen of Maryland and member of the USCA. Id. at 6 ¶ 14.
Mr. Grapek can claim no exemption from the PPACA’s Individual Mandate and,
in order to afford health insurance in 2014, he must immediately begin saving
thousands of dollars per year to afford the premiums for qualified insurance under
PPACA in 2014.
The individual Appellants do not have health insurance. They do not want it
and oppose it because, as explained below, it results in the second guessing of
physicians’ independent medical judgment (physicians who accept insurance
reimbursement are financially beholden to those companies and must abide by
their coverage determinations). See Affidavit of Jim Grapek, at ¶ 2 (R.E. 50-5);
Affidavit of Maurice A. Thompson, at ¶¶ 6-12 (R.E. 50-6). They do not want to
contract for health insurance that will cover unwanted medical services. Id. They
wish not to be associated with health insurers. They do not want to divulge their
medical files and health status to any health insurer. Id. Although Congress
included several exemptions to the Individual Mandate, 5 none apply to the
individually named Appellants. See Affidavit of Grapek, at ¶ 5 (R.E. 50-5);

5

See PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (religious exemption); PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(B)
(Healthcare ministry exemption); PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(C) & (D) (incarceration
exemption); PPACA § 5000A(e)(1)(A) & (B) (contribution exemption); PPACA §
5000A(e)(2) (poverty exemption); PPACA § 5000A(e)(5) (hardship exemption);
PPACA § 5000A(e)(3) (native American exemption).
13
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Affidavit of Thompson, at ¶ 9 (R.E. 50-6); see also PPACA §§ 5000A(d)-(e).
Beginning in 2014, the penalty provision of the PPACA 6 will be imposed. 7 The
District Court found that Appellants Grapek and Thompson must rearrange their
affairs presently to comply with the Individual Mandate because they will be
subjected to the Mandate in 2014 unless they experience an unexpected change in
their circumstances. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, R.E. 58, at 5-6.
Appellants Grapek and Thompson are served by physicians who accept
payment out-of-pocket. See Grapek Affidavit ¶ 10 (R.E. 50-5); Thompson
Affidavit ¶ 10 (R.E. 50-6). Appellants believe that physicians who receive
payment for services from third-party insurance companies are financially
beholden to those companies and, so, those physicians’ professional judgments and
decisions concerning methods of treatment are influenced by whether the third
party considers the service in issue medically reasonable and necessary and,
thus,reimburseable. See Grapek Affidavit ¶ 10 (R.E. 50-5); Thompson Affidavit ¶
10 (R.E. 50-6); see also Orient Affidavit ¶ 5 (R.E. 50-9). Appellants’ belief is
supported by expert medical opinion in the record below: Contracts with thirdparty payers can create conflicts of interest for physicians and limit their discretion

6

See PPACA § 5000A(b)(1).
The PPACA’s individual penalty would start at $95, or up to 1 percent of income,
whichever is greater in 2014, and rise to $695, or 2.5 percent of income, by 2016.
See PPACA § 5000A(c)(3). The family limit will be $2,085 or 2.5 percent of
household income, whichever is greater. See PPACA § 5000A(c)(4).
7
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to treat patients. See Orient Affidavit ¶ 5 (R.E. 50-9). For example, as a costcontainment measure, insurers can establish financial incentives that benefit
physicians as they reduce the delivery of certain beneficial services. Id. Thirdparty payers rely on utilization reviews and quality assurance committees that may
penalize physicians who use their best judgment through low performance ratings,
and may delist physicians to the detriment of their reputations and career
opportunities. Id.
Appellant Jim Grapek prefers alternative and integrative medicine or
“complementary and alternative medicine” (“CAM”) not covered by health
insurance policies. See Grapek Affidavit ¶ 12 (R.E. 50-5). Alternative therapies
are not included in the list of minimum coverage requirements necessary for a
qualifying plan under PPACA Section 1302(b)(1)(A)-(J). Medicare and Medicaid
do not provide coverage for CAM services. See R.E. 54 at 2-3, Brief Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opp. to Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss filed by Alliance for
Natural Health USA (“ANH Amicus”) (citing Michael Ruggio, et al.,
Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Longstanding Legal Obstacles to
Cutting Edge Treatment, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 137, 165-66 (2009). 8 Private
insurers follow Medicare guidelines closely and, so, CAM services are not covered
8

The Alliance for Natural Health USA (“ANH”) filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the plaintiffs/appellants’ opposition to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, wherein the ANH presented facts in the public record that demonstrated
the existence of an actionable claim.
15
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by private policies. Id. Appellant Grapek stated by affidavit that “money [he]
must pay into government-sanctioned insurance limits [his] choice of health care to
those traditional, covered services available in a government-approved health plan”
because “[a]ny money that [he] spend[s] on government-compelled health care
takes away from money that [he would] spend on holistic, integrative, natural, and
alternative medicine of [his] choosing.” Grapek Affidavit ¶ 13 (R.E. 50-5).
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has never recognized
alternative and integrative medicine as deserving of insurance coverage despite the
fact that an estimated 38 million Americans rely on that subcategory of care as
their primary means for achieving wellness. See ANH Amicus, R.E. 54 at 2-3
(citing Ruggio, supra, at 142). At least one third of United States consumer
demand for health care services is directed at such care. See ANH Amicus, R.E.
54 at 2-3; Lori B. Andrews, The Shadow Health Care System: Regulation of
Alternative Health Care Providers, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (1996) (noting
that “[a] study published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that in
1990, 425 million Americans consulted alternative providers, while only 388
million consulted primary care physicians”) (citing David M. Eisenberg et al.,
Unconventional Medicine in the United States: Prevalence, Costs, and Patterns of
Use, 328 New Eng. J. Med. 246, 246 (1993)).
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According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, the
median American income is $50,303 before taxes and excluding capital gains. See
R.E. 54 at 10 (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Social and Economic (ASEC)
Supplement; Income Distribution Measures, by Definition of Income: 2008)
(Appx. at 43). The mean American income in 2008 was $68,424. Id. According
to the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) and the Joint Committee on Taxation
(“JCT”), the average premium under a “bronze” PPACA “qualified” policy will
cost between $4,500 and $5,000. See R.E. 54 at 10 (citing Cong. Budget Office,
Letter from Douglas Elmendorf to Senator Olympia Snowe Providing Estimated
Premiums for “Bronze” Coverage Under the PPACA, at 2 (Jan. 11, 2010)) (Appx.
at 53). For the average American, a $5,000 “bronze” plan will not exceed eight
percent of their income and, so, they will not be eligible for Government
subsidized health care. See PPACA § 1501 (Appx. 24) and 10106 adding IRC §§
5000A (d) and (e); § 1002 of Reconciliation Bill (providing subsidies for insurance
premiums that exceed 8% of household income). The purchase of a “bronze” plan
at $5,000 per year, however, will be one of the largest expenses for the average
American. See R.E. 54, at 10 (citing U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics; Consumer Expenditures in 2008, at 2 (March 2010) (Appx. at 56).
Based on average expenditures of $50,486, a “bronze” policy at $5,000 per year
would represent 9.9% of average household expenditures, or about 7.3% of the
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average income. See id. Americans in 2008 spent more money only on food,
housing, transportation, and Social Security. Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the Individual Mandate, for the first time Congress has ordered
American citizens to purchase a private service as a condition of citizenship.
PPACA § 1501 (Appx. 24). There is no express or implied enumerated power in
Article I that grants Congress authority to impose the Individual Mandate, a subject
in issue in the Thomas More appeal pending before this Court. Thomas More Law
Center, et al., v. Barack Obama, et al., No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. 2010). Moreover,
that forced purchase violates fundamental rights to liberty, to expressive and
intimate association, and to privacy. The freedom of competent adults to purchase
health insurance or not; to receive and pay for medical service of their choosing
legally available under state law; to associate with a particular medical professional
for the treatment of private medical issues; and to keep confidential from nongovernmental parties medical records and health status information are rights
protected under the United States Constitution. Those rights are violated by
PPACA’s Individual Mandate. Because Congress had available to it obvious
alternatives that would not violate those rights (e.g., exempting from PPACA all
who for whatever reason do not wish to be insured and do not wish to receive

18

Case: 11-3327

Document: 006110949623

Filed: 05/06/2011

Page: 29

insured care), Congress was constitutionally obliged to depend on those
alternatives.
The Fifth Amendment protects individual liberty from deprivation without
due process of law. The individual named Appellants are competent adults who
possess a liberty right to refuse unwanted medical service. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 278 (“[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from our prior decisions”). The Appellants cannot be compelled by force of law to
receive medical service they do not want. That same liberty right protects them
from being coerced into paying for health insurance covering medical services that
they do not want. By forcing the individual named plaintiffs to contract for, and
purchase with their own resources, health insurance covering medical services they
do not want, the Individual Mandate financially penalizes the Appellants for
exercising their right to refuse medical care. The Individual Mandate compels
Appellants to pay for unwanted health insurance with money otherwise available to
pay for health related services that they do want (from physicians who do not
accept health insurance reimbursement). Consequently, the Individual Mandate
financially penalizes the Appellants for exercising their right to refuse unwanted
medical service. Moreover, the Individual Mandate coercively denies Appellants
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resources that would otherwise be available to pay for the health care services that
they desire which are not covered by insurance.
The First Amendment protects the freedom not to associate with private
parties with whom the individual wishes not to be affiliated or connected. See
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“[f]reedom of association …
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate”). The individual named
Appellants do not have health insurance and do not want it. They expressly desire
not to be affiliated or connected with private health insurance providers or their
agents. The Individual Mandate denies them the right to dissent, coercively
forcing them to associate with and contract with private insurers against their will.
If Appellants forego PPACA health care and instead pay for alternative care, they
will be financially penalized, having either to pay a penalty to the United States
government (PPACA § 5000A(b) (Appx. 24)) or pay for unwanted insurance
covering services not wanted. They will be stigmatized as law violators. The
PPACA therefore financially penalizes Appellants and stigmatizes them for
exercising their right to choose practitioners who do not accept health insurance
reimbursement and are thus not influenced financially to avoid exercise of
independent professional judgment in providing the best available care.
The right to privacy protects the individual named Appellants’ right to shield
from private parties confidential information concerning their health records and
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health status. Private insurers and/or their non-employee independent agents
require as a condition of contract for health insurance that prospective insureds
waive their right to privacy and divulge to the companies and agents confidential
health information concerning their health histories and status. See DiStefano
Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-9, 10 (R.E. 50-7); Report of Dr. Joanna M. Shepherd-Bailey at
16-18 (R.E. 50-2). Risk calculation indispensable to determine insurance
profitability depends on such information. Id. Despite the PPACA’s reforms,
information identifying preexisting conditions remain essential for a health
insurance provider to gather in aid of the insurer’s determination of overall risk
assumed by that provider. See Shepherd-Bailey, supra, at 16-18 (R.E. 50-2). Risk
calculus is, afterall, the sine qua non of the health insurance business. See
DiStefano Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-9. The Individual Mandate thus compels Appellants to
execute insurance contracts against their will and thereby forces them to disclose
confidential medical information to insurance agents and insurers against their will.
The forced disclosure of confidential health information violates the Appellants’
right to privacy. Given the available constitutional alternatives (such as an
exemption from the Individual Mandate for those who do not want health
insurance), the government may claim no overriding interest superior to the
Appellants’ right to privacy.
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ARGUMENT
Congress has no express or implied enumerated power in Article I that
grants authority to impose the Individual Mandate; that is the subject of the
Thomas More case now pending before this Court. Thomas More, No. 10-2388
(6th Cir. 2010). 9 Moreover, the forced purchase of health insurance (even if
deemed a Congressional power exercisable under the Commerce Clause) violates
fundamental rights to liberty, to expressive and intimate association, and to
privacy. Appellants have argued before the District Court that Congress lacks
authority to compel the purchase of private health insurance under the Commerce,
Necessary and Proper, and General Welfare Clauses. The District Court abstained
from ruling, observing that the issue is already before this Court in Thomas More
Law Center, et al., v. Barack Obama, et al., No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. 2010). The
Thomas More decision will determine whether Congress possessed Article I
authority, ab initio, to enact the PPACA’s Individual Mandate.
Even if this Court determines that the Individual Mandate survives
constitutional scrutiny under Article I, the Appellants’ appeal calls on this Court to

9

That is also part of the challenge by the Appellants in their Count 1 before Judge
Dowd in the district court below. Judge Dowd has abstained from acting on that
Count pending this Court’s decision in Thomas More. The Appellants challenge
below differs slightly from the Thomas More challenge in that Appellants have
also argued that Congress lacked an adequate basis to aggregate citizens of all
incomes within an overbroad category of citizens contributing to uncompensated
health care.
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determine whether that mandate unconstitutionally infringes the Appellants’
individual rights to liberty, freedom of association, and privacy.
A decision in Thomas More holding the PPACA unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause would not necessarily moot the instant appeal because of a
possible review by the U.S. Supreme Court on that issue. This Court should
proceed, regardless of its decision there, to address the issues raised in this appeal,
since these specific issues may not be determined by any other federal court and
therefore a decision is important to preserve the right of appeal by the losing party.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews “de novo a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Kottmyer v. Maas, 436
F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006); Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group, Inc., 342 F.3d
444, 451 (6th Cir. 2003). In reviewing the district court’s decision to grant a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, this Court “accept[s] all the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true
and construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.”
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466-67 (6th Cir. 2009); Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Plaintiffs’ complaint “need contain only enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d
273, 277 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
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“The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything is alleged in
the complaint as true.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 637 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing
Nishiyama v. Dickson Co., Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987)). In this case,
where the District Court made no findings of fact and entered a decision without
reasoned legal opinion, this Court recommences the legal review, deciding
“whether or not it agrees with the decision under review.” Perry v. Simplicity
Eng’g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990). “A review of a district court’s
interpretation and application of a statute is de novo.” U.S. v. Howard, 129 f.3d
1266, Table at *4 (6th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases); see also Canaday v. Kelley, 37
F.3d 1498, Table at *11 (6th Cir. 1994) (“the record on appeal consists of the
original papers” and “the appellate court should have before it the records and facts
considered by the district court”).
The District Court erred when it dismissed Appellants’ Counts 2, 3, and 4.
The record below demonstrates that the PPACA’s Individual Mandate imposes
coercive conditions on the Appellants that violate their individual constitutional
rights to liberty, association, and privacy.
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II. THE PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE VIOLATES THE
PLAINTIFFS’ FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO LIBERTY
Competent adults have a fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical
service. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (“[t]he principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions”); Rochin, 342 U.S. at
171-73 (protection against forced stomach pumping). That right includes refusing
even life-saving medical care See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; Rochin 342 U.S. at
171-73; see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Karp v. Cooley, 493
F.2d 408, 419 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that “the root premise jurisprudentially is
that every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body”). The decision whether to receive medical
treatment is certainly a choice “central to the personal dignity and autonomy”
affecting one’s family or destiny. It is central to liberty. See Washington, 521 U.S.
at 726; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining
that control over medical decisions is a “deeply personal decision”). The right to
make autonomous medical decisions is among the “oldest fundamental rights
recognized by the law.” See Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical
Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 304-05
(2008) (describing the Supreme Court’s “autonomy cases” and concluding that
“[i]t is largely the bodily integrity right, combined with the right to make certain
25
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intimate and important decisions autonomously, that is front and center in [these]
cases”); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[a] right to control over one’s
body has deep roots in the common law”), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F.Supp. 796, 816-18 (S.D. Ohio
1995) (collecting Supreme Court cases concerning the right to be free from
unwanted bodily intrusions).
The Supreme Court explained the fundamental right to medical autonomy in
Casey. See Planned Parenthood v. Se. of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
When confronting Pennsylvanian statutory conditions on the right to receive an
abortion, the Court stated:
Our cases recognize the right of the individual . . . to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child . . .
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.
Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted; emphasis original). Casey characterized the
Court’s Roe decision: “Roe … may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold
liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily
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integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power
to mandate treatment or to bar its rejection.” Id. at 857. The Supreme Court has
thus acknowledged the fundamental right to make autonomous medical decisions,
to reject unwanted medical care and to choose among available care legal under
state law. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993) (no
constitutional right to access treatments when government has prohibited it for the
safety of citizens); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (government has long
history of regulating the safety of drugs and, therefore, plaintiffs had no
fundamental right to access unapproved drugs).
Because a competent adult’s decision to reject medical service is
constitutionally protected then, a fortiori, the decision not to pay for that service is
subsumed within the liberty right. Forcing one to pay for undesired care involves
state coercion contrary to the same liberty interests against receipt of unwanted
medical service protected from state deprivation by the Fifth Amendment. Indeed,
it would render nugatory the liberty to refuse unwanted service if the state could
penalize every person so refusing by forcing them to pay the cost of the unwanted
service they did not receive. That, in fact, is the modus operandi of the Individual
Mandate. The mandate compels Appellants to purchase health insurance for
payment of medical services Appellants reject and will not receive. Fifth
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Amendment liberty precedent plainly protects their right to refuse the unwanted
service, and the command that they pay for it via insurance (or be deemed an
outlaw and pay a statutory fine) imposes a coercive burden on the exercise of that
right to refuse.
Appellants must either pay for unwanted health insurance that covers
unwanted medical services or suffer a financial penalty for not doing so. Financial
penalties that burden the exercise of fundamental rights are forms of coercion and
are presumptively unconstitutional. Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154
F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 1998); Barnes v. Board of Trustees, Mich. Veterans Trust
Fund, 369 F.Supp. 1327, 1334 (W.D. Mich. 1973). If the fundamental liberty right
to refuse unwanted medical care is to be preserved, a competent adult may neither
be compelled to receive nor pay for unwanted medical care consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan.
The Individual Mandate requires Appellants to pre-pay for medical services
through private health insurance, the covered services of which are ones authorized
by the government. PPACA § 5000A(b) (Appx. 24). Medical insurance is medical
care paid forward. Insurance companies apply premiums against future medical
expenses incurred. For a select few, the costs of medical services exceed the
premiums paid. For others, however, medical care has been paid twice over by the
time a major medical procedure is required. Insurance companies could not
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operate profitably otherwise. When medical care paid forward is unwanted
medical care, the right to refuse is financially penalized. Those who would refuse
medical care may do so for a variety of reasons and their choice of reason,
provided they are competent adults, is not subject to second-guessing by the state
(indeed, it is not even relevant). As a protected liberty interest, the freedom to
decline treatment cannot be abridged by imposing on the right to refuse the
requirement that the party so refusing pay a penalty for exercising the right. See
Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943) (“a person cannot be
compelled to purchase, through a license fee or tax, the privilege freely granted by
the Constitution”); Toledo, 154 F.3d at 321 (“[s]imply put, government may not
place obstacles in the path of a person’s exercise of a constitutionally protected
right”); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (a statutory
classification which “significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right” is subject to heightened scrutiny, and can be upheld only if “it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only
those interest”).
The high Court’s precedent establishes a right to personal control over
medical decisions. The exercise of that right cannot be financially penalized by
government absent compelling circumstances. See J. Paul Singleton, The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly: How the Due Process Clause May Limit Comprehensive
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Health Care Reform, 77 TENN. L. REV. 413, 426-427 (2010) (summarizing
precedent and explaining that “history suggests that even in some of the most
extreme circumstances a similar right has traditionally been protected”) (collecting
cases). The Individual Mandate lacks narrow tailoring: It could have excluded
those who do not want health insurance and who instead desire to pay out-ofpocket for the care they receive. If there are financial costs to the government
associated with protecting the liberty right in issue, that is the price the government
must pay for the preservation of constitutional government and the inviolability of
constitutionally protected rights. The PPACA’s Individual Mandate should
therefore be declared unconstitutional as a violation of Appellants’ Fifth
Amendment right to liberty.
III.

THE PPACA VIOLATES THE PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION
By compelling Appellants to enter into associations with third party insurers

against Appellants’ will (in order to receive “qualified” medical services under
PPACA that Appellants do not want to receive), the Act violates Appellants’
constitutional right not to so associate. Appellants oppose health insurance
because of the control it exerts over reimbursed physicians’ decisions on what
services to provide. Physicians who accept insurance reimbursement are desirous
of not providing care that will go unreimbursed or might trigger an insurance audit
of their practices, so they are loath to deviate from insurance covered services
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when treating the insured. Grapek Affidavit, at ¶ 10; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶ 10;
Orient Affidavit ¶ 5 (R.E. 50-9). Appellants pay out-of-pocket for medical service
precisely because they want their physicians to provide the best care, including
care not covered by health insurance. They view health insurance as exerting a
coercive influence on independent medical judgment to their detriment and, so,
they are vocal opponents of it. Grapek Affidavit, at ¶ 10; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶
10; Orient Affidavit ¶ 5 (R.E. 50-9).
Appellants desire to associate with medical professionals who do not accept
insurance reimbursement and are thus under no financial or other coverage
restrictions that impair those physicians’ exercise of independent professional
judgment or their choice of providing services not covered by insurance plans.
The Individual Mandate penalizes Appellants for choosing providers who do not
accept insurance reimbursement over those who participate in PPACA-qualified
health care plans. Appellants must in effect pay twice, once for insured care they
do not want and will not use and again for their preferred care from physicians who
do not accept insurance reimbursement.
The PPACA violates the Appellants’ freedom of expressive association
because the Individual Mandate’s compulsory association with insurance providers
substantially burdens the Appellants’ expressive conduct, to wit, their overt
criticism and boycott of medical care funded by third-party insurance companies.
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The Appellants are outspoken critics of third-party payers and believe that the
current system of insurance reimbursement coerces physicians into providing
covered care that may not be in the best interests of the insured. Grapek Affidavit,
at ¶ 10; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶ 10. According to their view, health insurance
excludes innovative care and exercises influence over physician judgment such
that they avoid care if it entails provision of service not covered by the insurance
plan.
A. Freedom of Intimate Association
1. The patient’s relationship with her doctor is intimate and
protected under the freedom of intimate association
The “freedom of association … plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.” See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). Exercise of the
freedom not to associate with another private party is not limited by the economic
or ideological reason each person harbors for refraining from making a connection.
It is, thus, quintessentially a right that may not be deprived by the government on
the paternalistic notion that the government knows better than the individual with
whom the individual should associate. See Douglas O. Linder, Freedom of
Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1878, 1901
(1984). “The freedom of intimate association … stems from the necessity of
protecting individuals' ability ‘to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships [that] must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of
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the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central
to our constitutional scheme.’” Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 49899 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618-19).
Courts protect the doctor-patient relationship through the right of privacy
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
which encompass the right to intimate association. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (“when the State interferes with individuals' selection
of those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, freedom of
association in both of its forms may be implicated”). Courts have “long
recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty,
it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal
relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified [State]
interference.” Id. at 619 (collecting cases).
The right of intimate association entails the right to be free from compulsory
intimate relationships. In Roberts, Justice Brennan explained, “[f]reedom of
association … plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 623; see also Thomas S. by Brooks v. Flaherty, 699 F.Supp. 1178, 1203
(W.D.N.C. 1988) (freedom of expressive association case explaining “the right [to
freedom of association to] include[] freedom from state coerced association”).
Under Roberts, constitutionally protected intimate relationships are “distinguished
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by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decision to
begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. Rust, 500 U.S. at 174-75.
The doctor-patient relationship includes all characteristics requisite to
application of the freedom of association right (the intimacy, importance,
selectivity, and seclusion defined by the Court in Roberts). Roberts, 468 U.S. at
620. Medical care decisions are highly personal to the individual. See, e.g.,
Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F.Supp. 1038, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1991) (“[i]t could be argued by analogy that traditional
relationships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under
the First Amendment from Government regulation…”). A visit to the doctor
requires open discussion and disclosure of highly personal information. For many,
the visit may come when the patient is most vulnerable. The choice of doctor and
treatment depends on trust. Often the patient’s only defense against the uncertainty
of disease is the doctor’s advice. Indeed, the choice in a physician is highly
personal. The choice to receive treatment and from whom to receive it are
certainly decisions “central to the personal dignity and autonomy” that affects a
“family’s destiny.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997).
Citing the Supreme Court’s privacy decisions, the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Texas observed in Andrews that one’s choice of medical
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service is “fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 1045
(citing Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). The Andrews Court explained that
medical decisions are protected for two principal reasons:
First, although decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relations, and child rearing and education often
involve and affect other individuals as directly as they do one’s self,
decisions relating to medical treatment do not. They are, to an
extraordinary degree, intrinsically personal. It is the individual
making the decision, and no one else, who lives with the pain and
disease. It is the individual making the decision, and no one else, who
must undergo the treatment. And it is the individual making the
decision, and no one else, who, if he or she survives, must live with
the results of that decision. One’s health is a uniquely personal
possession. The decision of how to treat that possession is of no less
personal nature.
Second, it is impossible to discuss the decision to obtain or reject
medical treatment without realizing its importance. The decision can
either produce or eliminate physical, psychological, and emotional
ruin. It can destroy one’s economic stability. It is, for some, the
difference between a life of pain and a life of pleasure. It is, for
others, the difference between life and death.
Andrews, 498 F.Supp. at 1047. In addition, for some, acupuncture was a protected
choice between alternative and traditional care:
The choice is no less important for those who would choose
acupuncture over Western medical techniques. The alternative
Western treatment, whether drugs or surgery, may involve a serious
risk of side effects or injury. For example, a person suffering from
severe lower back pain may, denied the choice of acupuncture, be
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forced to undergo a spinal fusion and risk becoming a virtual invalid
for life.
Id.
For all citizens, particularly those with presently incurable medical
conditions, the treating professional and type of treatment are fundamentally
personal, intimate choices to make. Whether to receive medical treatment at all
and, when necessary, the type of treatment to receive and from whom are among
the most intimate decisions in life. The relationship between a patient and medical
practitioner is thus an intimate human relationship protected under the freedom of
intimate association. The decision to place trust in a particular medical practitioner
to the exclusion of all others (and to impart to that person medical histories,
records, and other intimate confidences) is highly personal and, certainly, as
personal and important as, if not more important by far than, the choice of one’s
attorney. 10 Under the Roberts criteria, therefore, the Plaintiffs’ choice of doctor or

10

The significance of the doctor-patient relationship is evidenced by state laws
protecting the relationship. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-664; CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 121025; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-583; DEL. CODE ANN. §
1232; FLA. STAT. ch. 381.0055; HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/1 et seq.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5602; MD. CODE ANN. § 4-302; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 111, § 70E; MINN. STAT. § 144.651; MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16525; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-511; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:8; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-01.3-01 et seq.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.3; OKLA. STAT. tit.
63, § 1-502.2; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001 et seq.; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-6-27; VA. CODE § 32.1-127.1:03; WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.020.
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medical provider and choice of desired care is protected by the First Amendment’s
freedom of association.
The view that the forced association here in issue does not deprive a person
of other desired associations is a superficial one in conflict with the precedent. The
forced association is itself the rights violation because it necessarily involves
compelling Appellants to divulge their medical confidences to insurers when they
would instead limit that to their preferred physicians who do not accept insurance
reimbursement (or to no one at all, if they should so choose). Moreover, the
compulsion to force the insurance association and the payment for unwanted
insurance covered services (by physicians who accept insurance reimbursement) is
coercive because it robs Appellants of resources they would otherwise have
available to advance associations with the physicians they prefer who do not accept
insurance reimbursement. It also forces them to be hypocrites, compelling them to
support the growth of private insurance and its promotional platform against their
overt public position against health insurance because of its coercive and limiting
effect on physician discretion (see supra at 13-15).
2. The PPACA’s Individual Mandate burdens a patient’s
choice of doctor and care
“Even an indirect infringement on associational rights is impermissible and
subject to the closest scrutiny.” Thomas S., 699 F.Supp. at 1203. Indirect
restraints violate the Constitution when they interfere with the associational right
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by burdening citizens’ rights “in any significant manner.” See Pathfinder Fund v.
Agency for Intern. Development, 746 F.Supp. 192, 195 (D.D.C. 1990) (concerning
the right of expressive association); see also Trujillo v. Board of County Com’rs of
Santa Fe County, 768 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 1985) (“freedom of
expressive association provides the most appropriate analogy for freedom of
intimate association”).
The PPACA’s Individual Mandate substantially and directly interferes with
the Appellant’s right to associate with medical practitioners, and to receive medical
care, of their choosing because the law forces them to associate with a specific type
of government-approved medical provider one who accepts insurance
reimbursement under a government qualified insurance plan. Innovative care, care
that exceeds in scope or nature what qualified plans cover, and alternative or CAM
care are not covered through PPACA-qualified health care plans.
Before the District Court the Appellees argued that “[m]oney is fungible; the
[PPACA] no more burdens the plaintiffs’ ability to associate with nonparticipating
practitioners than would any regulation that could cost plaintiffs money.” Defs’
Memo in Sup. of Mot. to Dismiss, R.E. 47-1, at 44. Not so. Appellees ignore the
coercive effect of the Individual Mandate. Intimate association is burdened when
it is financially penalized. Appellants must pay for unwanted insured care despite
the fact that those same resources are ones they would otherwise dedicate for out-
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of-pocket payment to physicians of their choosing who do not accept insurance
reimbursement. See Staman & Brougher, Cong. Res. Serv., at 3 (explaining that
PPACA legislation is novel) (R.E. 69-6); see also See Florida, 2011 WL 285683,
at *20; Thomas More, 720 F.Supp. 2d at 893; Virginia, 702 F.Supp. 2d 598, 612
(E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010). Appellants are forced to pay double and to reveal
medical confidences against their will to receive the care they want. The penalty
results from increasing costs and burdens for receipt of medical service.
To associate with physicians who do not accept insurance reimbursement,
the Individual Mandate compels the Appellants also to associate with those who do
and to pay for qualified health insurance plans they do not intend to use. The
decision to forego insurance covered service thus carries with it a financial penalty
on that freedom to associate. That financial penalty substantially limits the
resources available to Appellants for receipt of the care they desire and thus is
coercive.
Here the coercive burden on citizens’ rights is more profound in magnitude
and extent than the loss of Texas citizens’ right to access acupuncture in Andrews,
wherein the Southern District of Texas held that the Texas Medical Practice Act
unlawfully prevented access to acupuncture therapy. See Andrews, 498 F.Supp. at
1045. The question is whether the challenged statute “impos[es] a burden on,” or
“significantly interferes with,” the Appellants’ freedom to choose physicians and

39

Case: 11-3327

Document: 006110949623

Filed: 05/06/2011

Page: 50

receive care lawful under state law that is to their liking. See Carey, 431 U.S. at
686; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. It does both. In Andrews, the Texas Medical
Practice Act did not render acupuncture therapy unlawful in toto. The Texas law
permitted only licensed medical doctors to practice acupuncture and, at the time,
no licensed physician in Texas was skilled in acupuncture. Id. at 1041, 1051.
Thus, the effect of the Texas Medical Practice Act was to burden the availability of
acupuncture, despite the fact that the law did not expressly forbid it. Id. (“[t]here
can be little doubt that the articles and rules challenged in the present case ‘impose
a burden on’ and ‘significantly interfere with’ the decision to obtain acupuncture
treatment”).
The Individual Mandate “substantially limit[s] access to the means of
effectuating” a choice in receiving uninsured health care. The Federal Government
has made the choice for citizens; they must purchase private health insurance and
pay for it whether they wish to receive insured care or not. The coercion effected
is palpable because individual resources are not infinite and the forced removal of
$5,000 or more from one’s purse to pay for unwanted medical care necessarily
diminishes the funds otherwise available to pay for wanted care.
3. The Individual Mandate is not narrowly tailored to the
Government’s interest in providing health care coverage to
Americans
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The Individual Mandate violates Appellants’ freedom of intimate association
because it (1) limits their financial resources available to pay for uninsured care of
their choosing and (2) financially penalizes them and stigmatizes them as outlaws
for associating exclusively with practitioners who do not accept insurance
reimbursement. Because the Individual Mandate “significantly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388; see also U.S. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 956
(6th Cir. 1998) (“[g]overnment action that burdens a fundamental right will survive
a substantive due process challenge only if it can survive strict scrutiny, i.e., if it is
narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.”); Montgomery v. Carr,
101 F.3d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1996). 11 “[G]overnment restraints that absolutely or
largely preclude the formation of intimate associations are subject to strict
scrutiny.” Driggers v. City of Owensboro, Ky., 110 Fed. Appx. 449, 511 (6th Cir.
2004).
“[T]he term ‘narrowly tailored,’ … may be used to require consideration of
whether lawful alternative and less restricted means could have been used. …
[T]he classification at issue must ‘fit’ with greater precision than any alternative

11

“Narrow tailoring” requires the government action to be the least restrictive
means of promoting the compelling interest. Am. Booksellers Found. for Free
Expression v. Strickland, 601 F.3d 622, 628 (6th Cir. 2010).
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means.” Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986); see also
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656-58 (2000); Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572-73
(1995); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977); Hudson
v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1984).
The Constitution requires that the Court “examine carefully … the extent to
which [the legitimate government interests advanced] are served by the challenged
regulation.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 199 (1977). PPACA’s
Individual Mandate is not narrowly tailored to serve the Government’s interest
because it contains no option to escape the mandate for those who desire not to
associate with private insurers and to pay, instead, out-of-pocket for medical
service from physicians who do not accept health insurance reimbursement. Far
from narrowly tailored, the PPACA’s Individual Mandate is of the broadest
possible scope. It applies to all Americans subject to few narrow exemptions
principally based on economic status. See PPACA § 5000A(d)(2) (Appx. 24).
The Government claims an interest in providing health care coverage to
more Americans by, inter alia, forcing every American to subsidize insurance
markets and by eliminating costs of uncompensated care. See PPACA §
1501(a)(2)(A)-(H) (Appx. 24-34). But the PPACA is not narrowly tailored to
remedy the harms Congress identified. Rather than directly addressing Congress’s
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concerns, the Individual Mandate compels private insurance companies to solve
them and, in turn, forces citizens to pay for those private actions by leaving the
citizens with no choice but to buy federally qualified health insurance plans.
Congress depends on the addition of “millions of new consumers to the health
insurance market, increasing the supply of, and demand for, health care services.”
See PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(C). The influx of insurance business allegedly permits
insurance companies to afford the remaining Congressional reforms.
Congress had available obvious alternatives that were less restrictive than
the Individual Mandate. Congress could have funded universal medical savings
accounts based on individual need, thereby providing resources that people could
expend either for insurance coverage of their liking or for direct payment to receive
service from physicians who do not accept insurance reimbursement. In addition,
because uncompensated care was the principal basis for the Individual Mandate,
increasing taxes to cover uncompensated emergency room care would have
eliminated a substantial (alleged) burden on interstate commerce while preserving
the associational rights of citizens. See Def. Memo in Sup. of Mot. to Dism. at 3
(R.E. 47-1). Congress could also have simply added an exemption from the
Individual Mandate for those who do not want private insurance and agree to pay
out-of-pocket for their care.
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Those alternatives, which would not violate the Appellants’ right to freedom
of association, were rejected or left unaddressed by Congress. The Individual
Mandate is not narrowly tailored to support the Government’s interest and,
therefore, should be declared unconstitutional as a coercive burden on Appellants’
freedom of intimate association.
B. Freedom of Expressive Association
The freedom of expressive association is broad. See Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). Below the District Court received evidence of
the Appellants’ outspoken belief, articulated through the U.S. Citizens Association
and other groups with which they are affiliated, that health insurance
reimbursement exercises a perverse influence over physician judgment, causing
physicians to avoid care that is not covered by insurance plans to reduce the risk of
insurance company second-guessing of medical judgment and the risk of insurance
audits. See, e.g., Grapek Affidavit, at ¶ 10; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶ 10. The
Appellants do not want to pay for private health insurance and support the private
health insurance platform which advocates insured care.
The right of expressive association “protects a group’s membership
decisions and also protects against laws that make group membership less
attractive without directly interfere[ing] with an organization’s composition such
as requiring groups to disclose their membership lists or imposing penalties based
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on membership in a disfavored group.” Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524,
537 (6th Cir. 2010); Besig v. Dolphin Boating and Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271,
1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[w]e readily acknowledge that among the rights protected
by the first amendment is that to freedom of association, and its corollary, the
freedom from coerced association with groups holding views with which the
nonmembers disagree”); Matter of McLouth Steel Corp., 23 B.R. 167, 171
(Bkrtycy. Mich. 1982) (“[t]he First Amendment protects the freedom not to be
required to associate with the same degree of force with which it protects the
freedom of association itself” ).
The Supreme Court applies a three-part inquiry to freedom of association
claims. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 655. First, the court determines whether a
group is entitled to protection. Id. Second, the court evaluates whether the
government action “significantly burdens” the group’s expression, affording
deference “to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.” Id. at
653. Third, the court weighs the government’s interest in the restriction against the
plaintiff’s right of expressive association.” Id. at 656.
First, Appellants’ expression of beliefs against insurance-based medical care
is constitutionally protected political speech. Their articulation of a preference for
practitioners who do not accept insurance reimbursement is based on their desire to
receive independent professional judgment and the best possible care, regardless of
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the insurance reimbursement status of that care or the extent to which the
government considers it appropriate in a qualified plan. See Grapek Affidavit, at ¶
10; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶ 10; see generally Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F.Supp. at
1046-47 (stating that “[t]he decision to obtain or reject medical treatment, no less
than the decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy, meets the ‘personal criteria
sufficient to incur privacy protection’”). Plaintiffs’ affiliations with physicians
who practice medicine without insurance reimbursement are entrenched and
committed like the bonds that tie proponents and opponents of abortion to their
respective medical affiliations. PPACA coercively redirects health care dollars
that would otherwise be paid for uninsured care into the insurance marketplace,
diminishing the funds available for uninsured care. Articulation and advocacy of
Appellants’ reasons for not associating with practitioners who accept insurance
coverage is indeed a form of expressive conduct; it is political advocacy. It is
“overly apparent” that a person choosing one medical service over another has a
belief that the chosen service is more effective or healthy. See Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). In the case of medical service free from the second
guessing of insurers, the ideological choice is particularly apparent because the
decision dissents from care most Americans are willing to accept and dissents at
personal expense. Furthermore, the Appellants broadcast their views to others to
promote their goal of independent exercise of medical judgment free of insurance
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company second guessing. See Grapek Affidavit, at ¶ 6; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶
6.
Second, the PPACA’s compulsory association with private insurance
companies providing insurance-based medical care burdens the appellants’ ability
to express their message by compelling their association with the private group
they oppose and by compelling their funding for private insurance platforms that
promote the insurers’ qualified plans and use of preselected approved physicians
who are under contract provisions to health care insurers. See Vigil v. South Valley
Academy, 247 Fed. Appx. 982, 988 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[a] plaintiff alleging a
violation of the right to expressive association may support his or her claim by
demonstrating, inter alia, some form of government action to impose penalties for
the expression of political views”). Appellants cannot freely and economically
maintain their position against insurance-based medicine if compelled to associate
with and pay for private health insurance and the private insurers’ platforms for
promoting that insurance.
It is of critical importance to recognize that the forced association is with
private insurers and that the Constitution includes neither an express nor implied
enumerated power in Article I to afford Congress the option of compelling a
private association of this kind. It is against this backdrop that the argument to
prevent the forced association has currency. The government is here compelling
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the purchase of a private service to which Appellants object publicly; it is forcing
them to finance private platforms advocating that insurance. This coercive
requirement to form private associations against their will and fund the
advancement of private insurance platforms they oppose violates the freedom of
expressive association.
The law thus forces them into a state of hypocrisy, compelling them to
forge private associations that advance an insurance orthodoxy they oppose. In
Roberts, the Court held precisely this kind of compulsory private association
unconstitutional because it limits the ability of individuals (within a group) to
express their message. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see also Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at
656-58; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73. Here the Appellants’ ability to express their
message against health insurance is significantly impaired by compelling
Appellants to associate with private insurers, but also to fund the group and,
necessarily, its promotional message antithetical to Appellants’ creed.
Finally, as discussed supra at 41-45, there are many less-restrictive options
available to prevent forced private associations.
IV. THE PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE VIOLATES THE
PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The intimate details of one’s health history and status are perhaps the most
personal, the most private, that we encounter. The decision not to divulge such
medical confidences and not to submit to medical testing and examinations in
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order to obtain private health insurance are deeply personal and private choices.
The Appellants are protected in their right to make those choices free of
government coercion by the constitutional right to privacy.
The Courts have recognized a fundamental right to privacy (often defined as
the right “to be let alone”). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (the framers “conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men”). Distinctively personal aspects of one’s life
fall within the right to privacy. See Board of Directors of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1945-46 (1987). The right to privacy thus
encompasses an individual’s interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters.
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99 (1971) (noting that cases characterized as
protecting “privacy” involve at least two kinds of interest, including the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of “personal matters”); Bailey v. City of Port Huron,
507 F.3d 364, 367 (6th Cir. 2007). “Personal matters” include medical records and
medical information and, thus, such information is subject to protection under the
right of privacy. See Hubbs v. Alamo, 360 F.Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (C.D. Cal.
2005). Ohio courts define the right to privacy as “the right of a person to be let
alone . . . and to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters
which the public is not necessarily concerned.” In re Search Warrant, --- F. Supp.
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---, 1996 WL 1609166, at *4 n.6 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting Housh v. Peth, 133
N.E. 2d 340 (Ohio 1956)); Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 824 F.Supp. 1190, 1196
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (“[t]he Sixth Circuit has clearly stated that, with respect to their
medical records, ‘it is firmly established that individuals have a constitutionally
protected right to privacy’”) (quoting Guitierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1539
(6th Cir. 1987). 12
The Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected privacy right in keeping their
medical history, medical records, and bodies free from unwarranted intrusion by
insurance companies acting as proxies for the federal government. See Moore v.
Prevo, 379 Fed. Appx. 425, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2010); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673
(6th Cir. 1998). “There are at least two types of privacy protected by the
[Constitution]: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
and the right to autonomy and independence in personal decision-making.”
Moore, 379 Fed. Appx. at 427-28. (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (1977)).
Courts have referred to the former as a “right of confidentiality.” Id. at *2; see

12

Federal courts have uniformly recognized that constitutional protection is owed
to medical information. See Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F.Supp. 979, 985 (N.D.
Ohio 1991); Fisher v. City of Cincinnati, 753 F.Supp. 692, 694 (S.D. Ohio 1990);
Doe v. Magnusson, No. Civ. 04-130-B-W, 2005 WL 758454, at *10 (D.Me. Mar.
21, 2005); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994); A.L.A. v.
West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Prevo, 379 Fed.
Appx. 425, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 824 F.Supp. 1190, 1196 n.2
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (collecting cases).
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also Mann, 824 F.Supp. at 1196 (“[t]he Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has, for
more than a decade, recognized a constitutional right of privacy in medical
records”); General Motors Corp. v. Director of the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, 636 F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir. 1980), cert denied,
454 U.S. 877 (1981); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1539 (6th Cir. 1987)
(“[i]t is firmly established that individuals have a constitutionally protected right to
privacy” in their medical records); Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F.Supp. 979, 985
(N.D. Ohio 1991); Fisher v. City of Cincinnati, 753 F.Supp. 692, 694 (S.D. Ohio
1990).
This Court applies a balancing test to privacy rights violations. See Mann v.
Univ. of Cincinnati, 824 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (“considering the
potential conflict between the asserted right of access to medical records and the
patient’s right to privacy”); Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D.
Ohio 1991); Lee v. City of Columbus, 2008 WL 2557255, at * 10 (S.D. Ohio 2008)
(noting that the disclosure of personal medical information is permitted only to the
minimal extent necessary to promote a proper interest). This Court follows a twostep inquiry: (1) the interest at stake must implicate a fundamental right or one
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; and (2) the government’s interest in
disseminating the information must be balanced against the individual’s interest in
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keeping the information private.” Bloch, 156 F.3d at 684; In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d
632, 642 (6th Cir. 1983).
In Moore, the Sixth Circuit held that a prisoner had a constitutionally
protected interest in his medical status, to wit, an HIV-positive test result. Id. at
*3. That medical status “is information of the most personal kind and that an
individual has an interest in protecting against the dissemination of such
information.” Id. (“we join the Second Circuit in recognizing that the
constitutional right to privacy in one’s medical information exists in prison”). In
so holding, the Court explained that a free citizen’s right to privacy exceeds that of
prisoners: “[w]e acknowledge … that a prisoner does not enjoy a right of privacy
in his medical information to the same extent as a free citizen.” Id. The Zuniga
Court held that data concerning medical treatment was subject to privacy
protections as a fundamental right. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 641-42 (psychiatric
patients’ right to prevent their doctors from disclosing their names and length of
treatment implicated a fundamental right). The Court concluded, however, “that
the state’s interest in obtaining the information outweighed the patients’ right to
prevent its publication” because the State sought the information to enforce
criminal laws. Bloch, 156 F.3d at 684-85 (summarizing In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at
642).
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Concerning the first prong of the Bloch test, as in Zuniga, the individual
named Appellants have a constitutional interest in keeping their medical histories
and health status confidential. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 641-42; Bloch, 156
F.3d at 685 (citing with approval, United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)). “Information about one’s body and state of
health is a matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the
private enclave where he may lead a private life.” Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
638 F.2d at 577. The individual named Appellants seek to avoid disclosure of their
personal medical information to private insurance companies and their agents.
Appellants have chosen not to acquire health insurance, in part, because they
would have to disclose medical histories and health status that they hold to be
strictly confidential. See Grapek Affidavit ¶ 14; Thompson Affidavit ¶ 12.
Concerning the second prong of the Bloch analysis, the Government’s
interest in disclosure of private medical information to insurance companies does
not outweigh the loss of privacy. PPACA does not prevent disclosure of medical
information to private companies, including, but not limited to, data concerning or
derived from (1) medical history reports, (2) blood samples, (2) DNA samples, (3)
urine samples, (6) physical examinations, and (6) past or current illnesses, diseases,
or medications. Such information is routinely required when enrolling in a private
health insurance contract. See DiStefano Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-9, 10 (R.E. 50-7);
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Report of Dr. Joanna M. Shepherd-Bailey at 16-18 (R.E. 50-2). Insurance
providers require information in order to assess their relative risk and exposure.
See Shepherd-Baily, supra, at 16-18 (R.E. 50-2). Without that information, an
insurer cannot ascertain relative risk in relation to the universe of possible
customer claims. Id. The health of its customers is essential to profit margins and,
so, insurers must collect medical information to determine whether a new enrollee
presents heightened risks. Id.; DiStefano Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-9, 10 (R.E. 50-7).
Under PPACA, private health insurance companies must provide PPACA
qualified plans and, to do that, they must collect private medical information from
the insureds. As PPACA qualified plan providers, health insurance companies act
as agents of the federal government. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004
(1982). A business is subject to constitutional restrictions when “there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)). Acts of private business may be attributable to the government when the
“State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004. “[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private
decision only when it … has provided such significant encouragement, either overt
or covert, that the choice must be in law deemed to be that of the State.” Id.; see
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also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (explaining that a State can
be held responsible for a private decision when the State exercised coercive power
or provided significant encouragement). Here, under Individual Mandate the
federal government compels citizens to contract with private insurance companies
and requires that those who provide insurance do so in ways that “qualify” under
the PPACA. See PPACA §§ 1301-1304 (Appx. 35); § 1301(a)(C)(iv) (a
“qualified” plan must “compl[y] with the regulations developed by the Secretary
[of HHS]”).
The government unites with and depends upon the private insurance industry
to implement the Individual Mandate but imposes no restrictions on the use of
funds received for insurance premiums beyond determining plan qualifications and
prohibiting denial of coverage for pre-existing conditions. Congress cannot escape
the constitutional ramifications of its legislation by implementing it through private
third parties. If the government cannot compel the disclosure of the information
itself, it may not do so by forcing a private contractual relationship which depends
on disclosure of that private information. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958) (the government may not indirectly accomplish what it cannot do
directly); Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32,
48 (1999) (same); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (same). As
Appellants’ experts explained below, private insurance is a risk calculation
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business that cannot function without knowledge of medical history and status to
assess degree of risk. See Shepherd-Baily, supra, at 16-18 (R.E. 50-2).
The Individual Mandate compels the disclosure of confidential medical
information—information that would otherwise remain confidential but for the
government’s mandate. Thus, the government violates the Appellants’
constitutional right to privacy by compelling the disclosure of confidential medical
information to “qualified” private insurance companies. The substantial
constitutional injury is complete upon disclosure. Certain insurance employees
and their agents work within the Appellants’ communities. Disclosure causes
Appellants to suffer apprehension that sensitive medical information will be
disseminated further. Indeed, to the appellants, the initial disclosure is an
intolerable personal violation that will only be compounded by knowledge that
community members employed by insurers may have knowledge of the intimate
details.
Appellants can prevent the disclosure of their information only by becoming
outlaws and paying a federally-imposed financial penalty, the Individual
Mandate’s “shared responsibility” payment. That payment penalizes parties who
choose to assert their right to privacy. “Allowing the government to penalize
conduct it cannot directly ban raises concerns that the government will be able to
curtail by indirect means what the Constitution prohibits it from regulating
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directly.” Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir.
1998); Barnes v. Board of Trustees, Mich. Veterans Trust Fund, 369 F.Supp. 1327,
1334 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (Congress cannot penalize the exercise of a constitutional
right absent a compelling governmental interest).
The government lacks a compelling interest to force Appellants to join a
government “qualified” private health insurance plan, and its means are not
narrowly tailored to achieve its purported interest in universal health care; the
means are not the least restrictive. The government has no compelling interest in
forcing Appellants to divulge health history and health status confidences as a
condition precedent to private contracting for health insurance. Congress did
nothing to protect against mandatory disclosures of medical confidences. Dr.
Shepherd-Bailey provided the District Court with substantial evidence
demonstrating the costs to the individual Appellants from disclosure of private
information. See Shepherd-Bailey, supra, at 18 (R.E. 50-2). The Appellants’ right
to privacy in their sensitive information outweighs the need for disclosure. See
Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.2d 477, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1994) (supervisor
clearly violated employee’s right to privacy by seizing personal medical history for
review; there was “no question that an employee’s medical records, which may
contain intimate facts of a personal nature, [were] well within the ambit of
materials entitled to privacy protection”); Moore 379 Fed. Appx. at 427-28
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(government’s interest in imposing a penalty may not outweigh prisoner’s privacy
rights in medical information such that prison officials could have violated
constitutional rights by disclosing information to members of prison population);
see also Rust 500 U.S. at 214-15 (restrictions on family planning funds that
prohibited certain communications with doctors was not narrowly tailored because
the government could have imposed rigorous bookkeeping standards rather than
distorting the doctor-patient dialogue concerning pregnancy options). That would
appear apparent from Congress’s decision to bar insurance carriers from refusing
coverage despite pre-existing conditions. Nevertheless, Congress did not go so far,
nor could it in dependence on private insurance markets, as to preclude private
insurers from gathering health history and health status information from every
insured. Indeed, the insurance industry cannot apply for reinsurance relief under
the PPACA without inspection of health history and status information and the
sharing of that information with the government. See PPACA §1341 (Appx. 76);
Shepherd-Bailey, R.E. 50-2, at 16-17.
The government provides no explanation for why disclosure of medical
information is necessary to its legislative goals. Lesser restrictive means exist for
alleviating Congress’s economic concerns expressed in PPACA Section 1501. See
PPACA § 1501(a)(2) (Appx. 24-25). Congress could have enacted a provision in
PPACA barring the collection of personal medical information by insurance
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companies. Congress could have placed limits on the PPACA’s reinsurance
program which ostensibly encourages the collection of medical information by
private insurers. See Shepherd-Bailey, supra, at 17 (R.E. 50-2) (explaining that the
PPACA provides reinsurance payments to insurers with particularly high-risk
enrollees, which requires companies to collect information relating to preexisting
conditions). Congress could also have enacted an opt-out provision, allowing
those who wished to preserve their right to privacy by not divulging confidential
medical information to be able to do so by exempting such individuals from the
Individual Mandate. Because Congress has not tailored its legislation to prevent
unwanted disclosure of personal medical information to private insurers, the
PPACA’s Individual Mandate violates the right to privacy.

CONCLUSION
For foregoing reasons, Appellants’ respectfully request that this Court
reverse the District Court, declare the PPACA’s Individual Mandate
unconstitutional, and enjoin its enforcement.

Respectfully submitted,
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